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Net Assessment is a systematic method of analysis that
fulfills the need for an indirect decision support system
and provides a major input to the strategic
planning/management system in the Department of Defense.
Through an established process of appraising two or more
competitors as objectively as humanly possible, an analyst
is guided to examine factors normally overlooked.
Asymmetries that exist among competitors and the ability of
a competitor to achieve its objectives in various conflicts
are examples of some of these factors.
The net assessment process, useful applications of net
assessment, and attempts to improve analysis are addressed
in this thesis. These areas are examined to evaluate the
effectiveness of net assessment as a method of analysis
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The purpose of this study is to gather information about
a method of analysis used by the Department of Defense known
as net assessment. It is not the intent of this paper to
give an account of any current assessment but rather to
provide a learning aid to those persons that make up and
benefit from net assessments: members of the strategic
planning and intelligence communities. The author has not
had any practical experience in institutionalized net
assessment but hopes that through his academic research,
insight into the process will result. The material
presented herein is drawn heavily from unpublished articles
and interviews with people active in "net assessing." Of
particular importance were the unpublished notes of CDR
James J. Tritten, USN and CAPT Charles Pease, USN (Ret) .
Because net assessment is very complex and constantly
evolving, it is hoped that this study will stimulate
interest in others to continue research in this process
which provides desperately needed information to our
political and military decision-makers.
Special thanks deseirve to be given to the following
people for time spent during this research: LTC Barry Watts
USAF (Ret) , Dr. John Schrader, Mr. Dmitry Ponomareff , CDR
George Krause USN, Dr. Darnell Whitt, Prof. Norm Channell,
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and especially CDR Tritten who pointed me in the direction
of this interesting field of study.
I am extremely grateful to my wife Corinne for her
support and encouragement during this academic endeavor.
I would like to dedicate this effort to my parents
Anthony and Alice Konecny. By their example I have always
tried to do my best.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Providing decision-makers with an even-handed, objective
appraisal of the balance of forces between two competitors
is no easy task. When the adversary shrouds itself in
secrecy and undertakes a program of disinformation, the
difficulty in obtaining an accurate account of that balance
increases exponentially. Obviously, any aid to see the
status of competition more clearly is invaluable to the
decision-maker. One such aid, the topic of this study, is
the indirect decision support system called net assessment.
This study will discuss net assessment, primarily as a
method of analysis used by the Defense Department, and will
make recommendations to improve the efforts already under
way.
The purpose of net assessment is to provide executive
level management with an appraisal of the state of affairs
that affect the character and success of the total
enterprise. Although emphasis is often placed on military
analysis, the application of net assessment is just as
functional in political and commercial arenas. A properly
conducted net assessment will provide the policy-maker with
adequate information to allow the building of successful
objectives, goals, and strategies for the organization. Net
assessment is not intended to act as a planning or
programming system, but the conclusions are bound to set the
stage for these processes. The net assessor has done the
job correctly if there is an adequate answer to the question
"How do we stack up relative to the competition?"
(Marshall, 1976a)
Net assessment is a method of broad analysis normally
characterized by simultaneously focusing on two or more
competitors or opponents through a comparative process
(Marshall, 1976a, p. 1). It is not a specific technique or
analytic tool nor is it a well-defined area of study
(Marhsall, 1976a, p. 1) . Net assessment uses a number of
analysis forms developed since its inception to provide
impartial comparisons to any one or combination of
competitors. Traditional analysis techniques tend to focus
on statistical inputs or "bean counts," such as the number
of missiles each side has. Net assessment takes the
analysis deeper, shifting the emphasis toward such
organizational outputs as cost and time required to achieve
a given objective. Several types of net assessments are
normally conducted concurrently to gather the essence of how
well the organization will do. The various forms of
analysis and types of net assessments just mentioned are
discussed in more detail in Chapter II.
The concept of net assessment is not new. Assessments
of the United States' ability to deal with external threats
have been conducted since the beginning of American history
(Collins, 1980, p. 3) . Anyone that attempts to make an
appraisal of some situation is intuitively conducting a net
assessment. Organizations which conduct net assessments in






3) Think Tanks and government contractors
a) The RAND Corporation
b) Center for Naval Analyses
4) Legislative Branch
a) Congressional Research Service
b) Government Accounting Office
c) Congressional Staffs
5) Executive Branch
a) National Security Council
b) Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
c) Department of State




c) Other nations (the manner in which other nations
do assessments, especially the Soviet Union, is of
great importance to the analyst and is discussed
in Chapter II)
.
The list of who conducts net assessments is obviously
unlimited. Not all institutions, however, have access to
sensitive information or have an established methodology for
arriving at a well-rounded net assessment. Many agencies
which claim to furnish a net assessment are instead only
stating a simplistic, numerical count of existing forces
thereby neglecting to consider other influential factors.
The Department of Defense and other government agencies,
which have both access to classified information and an
established net assessment methodology, have been providing
a useful product to the President and Congress for nearly
two decades.
A present day application where net assessment could be
quite useful to the U.S. Navy is identification of the
Soviet naval threat. In the past, the U.S. Navy has
demonstrated the expansion of the Soviet Navy by using the
number of ship-days-out-of-area as an indicator. This
indicator showed a rising number of ship-days, and thus an
increasing Soviet threat, until 1984 when the trend began to
reverse itself (Philpott, 1988, p. 35). Reducing funds for
naval operations to help fuel the Soviet economy, building
fewer but larger ships, and continuing efforts to husband
their forces in port until needed are all possible
explanations for the drop in Soviet ship-days-out-of-area
since 1984 (Philpott, 1988, p. 35) . With the introduction
of large, sophisticated platforms such as the KIROV,
SOVREMENNYY, UDALOY, OSCAR, TYPHOON, BACKFIRE bomber, and
soon to be introduced aircraft carrier, it is doubtful that
the capability of the Soviets to threaten the U.S. at sea
has diminished. This case illustrates the inappropriateness
of using a simple model to depict the status of the
competition. Although manipulating simple models may effect
desired appropriations, bottom-line judgement of the
competition is what really should be provided to the
decision-makers
.
This thesis attempts to present net assessment as a
method of analysis that can assist both the analyst and
decision-maker when dealing with complex issues. Chapter II
reviews the process of conducting a net assessment, lists
some problems net assessors currently face, and lists
Department of Defense agencies which are conducting net
assessments. In Chapter III, a limited case study of the
United States/Soviet Union "strategic" nuclear balance is
performed. This case study highlights some issues important
to policy-makers and outlines some existing shortcomings in
conducting balance appraisals. Efforts to improve strategic
analysis through analytic wargaming is the subject of
Chapter IV. And finally, recommendations on policy
application are addressed in Chapter V.
II. MECHANICS OF NET ASSESSMENT
A. DEVELOPMENT
Organizational leaders, whether political, military, or
commercial, are constantly called upon to decide the
direction their establishment will follow. A number of
factors go into the making of those decisions. Experience,
judgement, and technical competence are among the key
internal factors decision-makers routinely call upon (OASG,
1977, p. vii) . In today's high tempo environment, however,
it seems obvious that no individual possesses the depth in
each of these categories to be prepared to deal with the
more complex situations that arise. As a result, many
attempts have been made to provide the decision-maker with a
logical approach to deal with difficult and original
concepts. Most of the more successful attempts are not
designed to provide the decision-maker with a clear solution
to a problem but as an aid to see the "truth" more clearly.
An early attempt to assist the executive in evaluating
solutions to operational problems was developed in Britain
and the United States during World War II. Operations
Analysis came into being when scientists were asked to form
solutions to military operational problems (OASG, 1977, p.
5) . Basically speaking. Operations Analysis is "the
application of scientific knowledge toward the solution of
problems which occur in operational activities (in their
real environment) . Its special technique is to invent a
strategy of control by measuring, comparing, and predicting
possible behavior through a scientific model of a situation
or activity." (OASG, 1977, p. 4) Some examples of how
Operations Analysis was used include: evaluating convoy
configuration for maximum submarine protection, evaluating
the best technique to protect merchant shipping from
aircraft attack, and optimizing the role of radar.
^
Further use of analytical problem solving in the
government received little attention until the early 1960s
when Secretary of Defense McNamara brought Systems Analysis
to the Pentagon. Systems Analysis has been described as,
...an inquiry to aid a decision-maker's choice of a course
of action by systematically investigating his proper
objectives, comparing quantitatively where possible, the
cost, effectiveness, and risks associated with alternative
policies; and formulating additional alternatives if those
examined are found wanting. (OASG, 1977, p. 16)
These descriptions of Operations and Systems Analysis
are not intended to be all inclusive and the full extent of
their possibilities requires further research by the reader.
Both methods of analyses have been useful as decision
support systems. The primary effort of these techniques.
^See Naval Operations Analysis . Operations Analysis
Study Group, U.S. Naval Academy for more details on
Operations Analysis.
^See How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense
Program, 1961-1969 . Enthoven and Smith, for a description
of efforts and accomplishments of the Office of Systems
Analysis in the Department of Defense.
however, is in the area of systems acquisition and force
structuring. Both of these methods of analysis place little
emphasis on the entire range of aspects that make up the
condition of competition. Furthermore, they rarely venture
into recommending alternatives for developing successful
national strategies and policies due to their close
association with programming and policy.
In light of this shortcoming, the concept of net
assessment unfolded in the early 1970s. It would not be
accurate to say that net assessment is a natural progression
of Operations and Systems Analysis or that it is a
replacement for these systems. Operations and Systems
Analysis are still providing valuable input to policy-
makers. Net assessment uses some of the basic concepts of
Operations and Systems Analysis but goes beyond mere systems
acquisition and force structuring.
In 1970, President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Panel on defense
organization recommended action to remedy the government's
inability to provide an impartial, nonpartisan appraisal of
the U.S. /Soviet military balance (Collins, 1980, pp. 3-4).
As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the
Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA) and assigned a director to
the office by way of Department of Defense Directive
5105.39. Under this directive, the Director of Net
Assessment was tasked with performing the following
functions:
1) Develop net assessments of current and projected U.S.
and foreign military capabilities by theater, region,
function, or mission. In accomplishing these net
assessments, the Director may call upon all available
intelligence data and all available friendly force
data.
2) Accomplish or provide for the development of specific
net assessments of current and projected U.S. and
foreign capabilities, operational tactics, doctrine,
and major weapons categories or systems.
3) Develop, advise and consult on the net assessment
portion of the Secretary's Annual Defense Report,
congressional testimony, and foreign government
discussions, and provide guidance for the preparation
of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Posture
Statement.
4) Provide guidance or staff assistance and
representation for the Secretary of Defense in the
development of national net assessments by the
National Security Council and act as primary focal
point for joint efforts with the intelligence
community to produce net assessments.
5) Coordinate and review net assessment efforts
throughout the Department of Defense.
6) Provide support for the improvement and development of
net assessments within the Department of Defense,
including, but not limited to, the maintenance of a
library of historical all-source intelligence and
friendly force data.
7) Provide objective analysis of policy, doctrine,
strategy, goals, and objectives, as requested or
determined necessary.
At about the same time, the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Evaluation began
conducting net technical assessments to appraise the
Secretary of Defense of technical matters. Because input
from each of the military services was perceived as a vital
ingredient to a net assessment, the Director of Net
Assessment encouraged each Service to establish an office
for net assessments. Minor net assessment activities were
set up in the 1) Office of Air Force Assistant Chief of
Staff, Studies and Analysis; and 2) Army Assistant Chief of
Staff, Military Policy and Strategy Planning. On the other
hand the U.S. Navy had already established the Navy Net
Assessment Organization in the Office of Chief of Naval
Operations, OP-96, Systems Analysis. This organization was
conducting net assessments along the same lines as
envisioned by the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
The participants in net assessment continued to develop
the process of analysis throughout the remainder of the
1970s and into the early 1980s. The institutions
established continued to be productive with more or less
influence depending on the political climate. By 1982,
Service interest in net assessments had almost entirely
dissipated; even the well established Navy Net Assessment
Organization was eliminated.
The importance of conducting net assessments was again
raised in June, 1986, when the Packard Commission (President
Reagan's Blue Ribbon Panel on defense reorganization)
advised the Secretary of Defense to provide the President
with "a military net assessment of the recommended national
military strategy and strategy options." (Packard
Commission, 1986, p. 14) Legislation quickly implemented
the recommendation with the Goldwater-Nicholas Act of 1986.
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That Act stated that the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for
"performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of
the armed forces of the United States and its allies as
compared with those of their potential adversaries."
(Goldwater-Nicholas Act, 1986)
Currently, three DOD agencies are performing net
assessments:
1) Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Net
Assessment (OSD/NA) —tasked with "the most macro view
within the Department of Defense in order to assist
the Secretary in his thinking about such questions as:
Where have we been? , Where are we now? , Where are we
going?" This office interfaces with other Executive
Branch offices to prepare net assessments of interest
on the national level. (Giessler, 1979, p. 2)
2) Office of the Under Secretarv of Defense fOUSD) for
Acquisition—assigned responsibility for conducting
net technical assessments with intent of ascertaining
the effectiveness of the U.S. technological/
industrial base and to reduce the effect of
technological surprise by an opponent.
3) Joint Chiefs of Staff fJCS) . Force. Structure.
Resources. and Assessment Directorate (J-8
)
--
designated to conduct military balance assessments
based on policy guidance from the Secretary of Defense
and provide strategy options based on those
assessments.
Each office seeks to arrive at an independent assessment
while simultaneously interacting with the sister offices
thus providing a product most beneficial to the nation.
B. TYPES
When making a decision that affects national security,
policy-makers intuitively conduct a form of net assessment
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on all characteristics of the balance of forces between the
U.S. and its competitors. Yet a single net assessment
product covering all aspects of the competition would be
extremely difficult to produce and overwhelming for the
decision-maker to comprehend. As a result, net assessments
have been divided into several categories.
1. Balance Assessments
Balance assessments address the question, "How do we
stand up to the competition?" with emphasis on military
matters. Due to the complexity of assessing global
competition, balance assessments are further divided into
functional and geographic areas. The U.S. /USSR strategic
nuclear, NATO-Warsaw Pact, East Asia/Pacific, worldwide
maritime, power projection, and military investment balances
are examples of these "sub-competitions." These assessments
are extremely broad in scope and fairly detailed in their
analysis. Balance assessments are updated periodically.
Additionally, special balance assessments, such as Command,
Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) and Space
competition appraisals, are conducted as particular needs
arise. Balance assessment methodology "includes static
side-by-side comparisons and head-to-head comparisons of
major military systems, trends in such comparisons, key
asymmetries in the opposing postures, and last but not least
some treatment of the qualitative factors to be considered."




Policy assessments address the status of competition
in terms of broad political/economic/social/military
aspects. They are analogous to methods used by large
corporations to appraise the competition and plot
strategies. Policy assessments are intended to assist high
level decision-makers in recognizing competitive advantage
and developing cost imposing strategies.
3 Net Technical Assessments
Net technical assessments attempt to ascertain the
effectiveness of the technological/industrial base and
reduce the effect of technological surprise by an opponent.
Net technical assessments are conducted principally by and
for the OUSD/Acquisition.
4 Comparative System Evaluations
Comparative system evaluations compare particular
military systems with respect to equipment, organizational,
and human factors.
5. Operational Net Assessments
Operational net assessments analyzes the strengths,
weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of an opponent's forces to




Weapons comparisons compare particular weapons to
determine what effect the significant characteristics may
have on battle outcome. (Marshall, 1976a, pp. 1-2)
Threat Assessments are not considered net
assessments. A threat assessment is an appraisal of the
opponent's intentions and capabilities which does not
consider one's own input into the balance. The Intelligence
Community normally provides threat assessments. Examples of
a threat assessment are the National Intelligence Estimates
conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
.
The Intelligence Community, being primarily
concerned with appraising the threat, is generally not
tasked with conducting net assessments. However, a joint
DOD/Intelligence strategic balance assessment is performed
as a result of a written agreement between the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.
C. PROCESS
To understand the concept of net assessment, one must be
familiar with the process. Perhaps the best procedural
description is provided by John M. Collins. Collins admits
that there is no cookbook approach to conduct a net
assessment, but he contends that there are four basic phases
to any assessment: compile, certify, combine, and compare.
(Collins, 1980, pp. 7-9)
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1. Phase One—Compile
In Phase One, information about all the participants
in the "competition" is gathered. The information collected
must include pertinent facts necessary for the type of
assessment being conducted. The analyst faces a double
edged sword when assembling this data. First, accurate and
reliable material is not always readily available. The
analyst must become educated on where to look while at the
same time feel comfortable in dealing with the sources. On
the other hand, the "age of communication" has made such
large quantities of information available that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to assimilate everything.
It is the analyst's job to separate "the wheat from the
chaff" in order to provide the decision-maker with a usable
working document.
Perhaps the most basic component of information
needed is the static force levels or the so called "bean
count." The number of divisions on the European "central
front," the equivalent megatonnage (EMT) of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, and the weapons capability of the KIROV class
guided missile cruiser are typical examples. Additionally,
operating characteristics, such as ballistic missile
submarine patrolling areas and Tu-95 Bear D reconnaissance
patterns must be included.
In addition to static force levels, non-quantifiable
information on the competitors must also be accumulated.
15
This type of data includes such factors as national goals,
political objectives, organizational makeup, reliability of
allies, leadership capabilities, levels of military training
and readiness, population characteristics, and geography
(Collins, 1980, p. 8). Although conceptually more difficult
than the mere counting of men and equipment, these non-
quantifiable factors are invaluable to a net assessment
(Pease, 1983, p. 4)
.
Historical data is an aspect that receives due
consideration for two reasons. First, historical data
allows one to focus on key factors upon which the occurrence
of events hinge. These key factors can then be used to
anticipate future developments. Second, most organizations
are not capable of conceiving a unique doctrine and
immediately implementing novel measures. For example, it
may take as long as 12 to 15 years for new naval
requirements to be translated into new ships (George, 1985,
p. 118) . Therefore, examining decisions and actions in the
past usually provides an insight into the direction of the
future.
The information described above is obtained by the
analyst from a number of sources. Information on current
and projected U.S. and allied goals and objectives is
available from the National Security Council and Staff, the
Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the
NATO Military Committee, and CINC/Allied war plans.
16
statistics on current and projected U.S. and allied military
forces are available from the Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NATO members, the
Services, and the Intelligence Community.
The intelligence community provides information
about the competition. Members of this community in the
U.S. include the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA)
,
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) , and the service
intelligence branches. Because there is no single
intelligence agency for NATO, each member country is
responsible for providing inputs to Allied organizations and
commands
.
Finally, useful information is also available from
open sources and contractors. Some examples of open sources
include the International Institute of Strategic Studies'
(IISS) The Military Balance , Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute's (SIPRI) Yearbook , and Jane's Fighting
Ships . Because these sources' access is limited to
unclassified material, their input is often incomplete. On
the other hand, contractors, such as the RAND Corporation
and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) , have access to
classified information (except extremely sensitive material)





This step is self-evident in its importance to the
net assessment process. If the fundamental data is flawed,
the appraisal presented to the executive will reflect the
defect—or as the saying goes "garbage in
—
garbage out."
Because a dispassionate evaluation is desired, the net
assessor must be aware of the fact that opponents will
attempt to provide disinformation and that mirror-imaging
may be present in data inputs when concepts are not
understood. Inaccurate information is not necessarily
limited to coming from the opponent. Improper documentation
of forces and erroneous data to support institutional biases
are also real possibilities. A heavy burden is placed on
the analyst to ensure that the data is as accurate,




In this phase the net assessment process begins to
take shape. "Step Three considers characteristics on each
side, first singly, then in combination, to ascertain
intrinsic strengths and weaknesses." (Collins, 1980, p. 7)
An effective starting point is to establish Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs) for the components of the area being
studied. An MOE is defined as a quantitative expression of
the extent to which specific mission requirements are
attained by the system under study (Taylor, 1984, p. 20).
Determining which MOEs to use and what the criteria is for
18
successful event outcomes are difficult tasks. Presently,
there is no exact science for assigning MOEs, but this
important step is valuable in arriving at an accurate
assessment.
4 . Phase Four; Compare
Phase Four is the most important and complex step in
the net assessment process. In this phase, all the concepts
of a comparative study come into play. Several of the more
important aspects are presented.
a. Combining Static and Dynamic Indicators
Once the necessary information has been
compiled, certified, and combined, it has to be evaluated as
a whole. All component parts must be tied together to
provide the decision-maker with the essential characteristic
of the competition. The static force levels or "bean
counts" of military personnel and equipment of each side are
an important first step, but they must be looked at in
regard to the national objectives, the actors intentions,
non-quantifiable factors (such as leadership, training and
geography) , and the involvement of allies.
A particularly useful way of looking at the
construction of a net assessment is to consider the
mathematical equation:
assessment = f(own forces, enemy forces, environment)
(Taylor, 1988, p. 8)
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Considering only the enemies capabilities or measuring the
enemies capabilities in terms of one's own forces are common
mistakes committed by analysts. In order to fully
understand the balance the analyst must include in the
appraisal one's own capabilities as well as the atmosphere
in which the competition is taking place. The notion of
"scanning the environment" encompasses this concept.
(Marshal, 1976a, p. 1)
Simple side-by-side and head-on-head numerical
comparisons are insufficient to properly assess the state of
military competition. Such comparisons do not take into
account the outcome or effect of a confrontation. By
anticipating the affects of weapons systems and targeting
schemes the analyst can provide the decision-maker with a
more comprehensive assessment of the comparison of forces,
b. Using Historical Data
Looking at the past and plotting trends is a
vital part of forming the assessment. It is rarely possible
to accurately predict the future, but it is possible to
evaluate how competitors acted in the past and identify
important characteristics of those actions. Previous
performance provides a basis to understand the "modus
operandi" of interaction and can lead to valuable insight
for anticipating future patterns (Cohen, 1988, p. 86).
Additionally, an analysis of historical cases can be used to
determine the key variables; providing insight to areas for
20
current research. Comprehension of policies and doctrinal
decisions made in the past can lead to a better feel for the
present and the future. This is attributed to the fact that
change usually does not occur immediately. Change,
depending on the scope, may take several years or even a
decade.
c. Using Multiple Indicators
A simple look at just one aspect of an opponent
will not provide the information necessary to form a
constructive assessment. This is especially true in the
case of the Soviet Union where their intentions and
capabilities are closely guarded. In order to penetrate
this "curtain of secrecy," an analyst must utilize every
source available. Three aspects that deserve special
attention are discussed below.
(1) Content Analysis of Open Literature and
Speeches Made by Ranking Officials . Even in tightly
controlled governments, a certain amount of information is
released to the public. These publications and speeches may
serve a number of purposes for the government.
1) a medium for propaganda.
2) a means of expressing an opinion by influential
officials.
3) a mode of disseminating accepted policy to a large
audience both internal and external
.
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An analyst must understand the variety of purposes for the
dissemination of the information and decide which purpose
applies to obtain the most from the information available.
(2) Evaluation of Military Exercises and Force
Deployments Conducted by the Opponent . Governments use
exercises to provide training for the military and to test
the validity of theories concerning the conduct of war. A
country can produce misleading information through specially
staged exercises. The analyst must be aware of this
possibility, however, as a general rule, an organization
will fight like it's trained. Deployments, such as the
stationing of troops, the deployment of ships out of area,
and the use of advisors in foreign countries, are also
indicators of interest areas.
(3) Examination of Military Hardware in an
Opponent's Inventory . Analysis of the types of ships,
tanks, and aircraft an opponent uses leads to a better
understanding of their intentions and capabilities.
d. Understanding the Opponent's Assessment
The way in which the opposition assesses the
balance is an extremely important aspect of analysis. The
goal of net assessment is to give an objective picture of
the political-military competition between opponents. A key
to obtaining this picture is to understand how the
opposition conducts assessments. The deterrence capability
of a nation's forces depends on convincing the opponent that
22
it would be disadvantageous for them to enter into a war.
If the enemy does not perceive the possibility of defeat,
then there is no deterrence. Thus, understanding how the
opposition performs assessments is an essential element in
one's own assessment. (Friedberg, 1988 pp. 193-194)
e. Contingency Analysis
Because relying on a limited number of threat
scenarios is dangerous for setting policy, analyst's must
consider all "realistic" scenarios not just the "best" or
"worst" cases. Major emphasis is given to preparing the
U.S. for strategic surprise while little attention is paid
to possible conflict arising from escalating tension. The
analyst's role is to explore the full range of conflict
possibilities including hostility initiation and likely war
outcomes. The decision-maker must be kept aware of the
extreme as well as the likely possibilities to reduce the
chance of being caught unaware. Simulations and games
provide a vehicle to flush out alternatives scenarios.
Chapter III will examine simulations and games in more
detail. The goal of contingency analysis is to determine if
one's own forces, either actual or planned, are capable of




Because allies and third parties play an
important role in establishing the balance of power, their
perception of the status of strategic competition must be
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carefully considered for a comprehensive assessment. Allied
contributions can be either positive or negative with
respect to the United States.
The concepts mentioned here form the basic tools
in conducting a net assessment. Just as it may not be
necessary to use each and every concept in all cases,
neither is the list all inclusive. Future research and
continued practice in this field may indicate more
appropriate theories. However, the list provided has been
developed over time and appears to capture the important
issues that lead to a successful assessment. The analyst
should learn the lessons from this development and make the
best use possible.
D. SUMMARY
Policy-makers have always conducted intuitive appraisals
of how their organization compares to its opponents. To
assist the policy-maker in coping with large complex
problems, a systematic approach to analysis called net
assessment was developed. No standard procedure exists for
conducting net assessments. There isn't even a universally
accepted definition of net assessment. Net assessment is
prone to the same difficulties as other forms of analysis
and is only as good as its data and analysts. But, the
various types of comparisons and organized methods of
dealing with key issues seems adequate to provide base-line
judgment needed by many decision-makers.
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III. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE CASE STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
Of all of the net assessments conducted, one of the most
crucial to the condition of national security is the
strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As Andrew Marshall
points out:
...our position with respect to that (strategic) balance
is a keystone for all of the other balances and has an
impact on them. In the case of the Central Front Balance
for many years that balance was in large part determined
by our strategic superiority and our superiority in the
tactical nuclear area. (Marshall, 1976b, p. 6)
In addition to being an assessment of great import, an
appraisal of the strategic balance is probably the most
difficult to conduct. The large number of variables, the
high degree of uncertainty, and the lack of proven methods
of analysis related to strategic forces makes this job a
perplexing one for the analyst. This chapter discusses
several strategic measures of effectiveness and conducts a
limited case study of the current state of competition to
demonstrate traditional methods of analysis.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES
AND POLICIES
To understand the strategic balance, it is best to start
with a brief history of the evolution of the U.S. nuclear
force postures and policies. In the 1950s, the U.S.
25
possessed a clear superiority in nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles. With such a significant nuclear
advantage, the U.S. adhered to a policy of massive
retaliation to deter a wide range of Soviet actions.
As U.S. nuclear superiority eroded in the 1960s,
emphasis shifted toward a policy combining the principles of
flexible response, damage limitation, and assured
destruction. This blend of U.S. contingencies eventually
gave way in the latter part of the 1960s to primary reliance
on the use of second-strike retaliatory forces and the
possibility of Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) in the 1970s.
Because of continuing Soviet buildup and improvements in
nuclear capabilities in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
U.S. implemented policies and actions to improve its
capability to compete in a nuclear conflict. Thus, nuclear
force modernization became a focus of attention. Efforts
concentrated on upgrading offensive and C3 capabilities
while devoting additional attention to strategic defense
research and arms control negotiations. (Pease, 1983. pp.
7-8)
C. BALANCE ASSESSMENT
The method most appropriate to address the status of
strategic forces is the balance assessment. A balance
assessment is the broadest in scope and therefore most
useful in addressing the question, "How do we stand relative
to the Soviets?" (Pease, 1983, p. 5) Although this
26
discussion is intended to demonstrate net assessment
techniques, this study could be used to determine if the
nuclear force modernization steps taken by the U.S.
Government have positively altered the balance. Data from
several unclassified sources are used to evaluated how the
U.S. stands relative to the Soviets.
A natural starting point in the comparison is resource
allocation. Figure 1 shows the trend in U.S. and Soviet
strategic force expenditures since 1965. The U.S.'s current
spending for the acquisition of offensive strategic forces
is equivalent to the USSR's. This is due to a sharp rise in
U.S. spending starting about 1981. However, the Soviet
investments in strategic programs over the long term are
much higher than the United States', especially in the area
of strategic defense.
Figure 1 presents an important picture for two reasons.
First, a snapshot in time is not necessarily a good
representation of the actual status; trends can be more
revealing. Although the U.S. is shown spending about the
same as the Soviets in 1986, the cumulative difference of
$140 billion since 1965 allowed the Soviets to exceed U.S.
efforts in procurement and modernization. Second, since
offensive forces fight against defensive forces, the
disparity identified in procurement of defensive systems












Source: (Weinberger, 1988, pp. 26-27)
Figure 1. Comparison of U.S. /USSR Strategic
Force Spending
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Comparing procurement expenditures is a fair indicator
of the status of the balance, but this measurement does
suffer some inadequacies. Among the problems are: the lack
of a standard dollar-ruble conversion, insufficient
intelligence estimates of Soviet defense spending, and
different production standards between the U.S. and the USSR
for a given cost. For these reasons, one must look at what
hardware the capital investments have provided.
Figure 2 displays U.S. /USSR new-system procurement and
existing system modification efforts for the past 3 years.
In view of the resource allocation discussion above, the
figure clearly indicates the Soviets have exceeded U.S.
efforts to put new and modified weapons into operation.
Although the Soviets have out-performed the U.S. in terms of
force modernization, actual and projected deployments by the
U.S. since 1981 are indicative of a positive trend in the
strategic balance. (Carlucci, 1988, p. 101)
Up to this point of the discussion, all that has been
considered is strategic force inputs. Now it is time to
compare the on-hand capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet
Union. A static side-by-side comparison of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) as of 1988 is presented in
Table 1. The initial unit of measurement is a count of
missile launchers and bombers. Counting the number of
launchers and bombers is currently the norm for tracking
























































(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
MM II 450 1 450 SS-11 420 1 420
MM III 511 3 1533 SS-13 60 1 60
MX 39 10 390 SS-17 138 4 552
SS-18 308 10 3080
SS-19 350 6 2100
SS-24 10 10 100
SS-25 100 1 100
1000 2373 L386 6412
ST.RMs
C-3 256 14 3584 SS-N-6 256 1 256
C-4 384 8 3072 SS-N-8 286 1 286
SS-N-17 12 1 12
SS-N-18 224 7 1568
SS-N-20 100 9 900
SS-N-23 64 10 640
640 6656 942 3662
BOMBERS
B-IB 99 12 1188 BEAR
(ALCM)
70 20 1400
B-52G/H 105 12 1260 BEAR 100 2 200
(nonALCM) (nonALCM)
B-52G 98 20 1960 BISON 5 4 20
(ALCM)
B-52H 60 20 1200 BACKFIRE 358 2 716
(ALCM)
FB-111 61 6 366
423 5974 533 2336
TOTAT.S
U.S. USSR






(a) Delivery Vehicles (b) Warheads per Vehicle
(c) Total Warheads
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technical means" and no on-site inspection provisions for
long range platforms.
An issue that concerns arms control negotiators as well
as analysts is how to properly classify various forms of
armament. Table 1 exhibits one such area of controversy.
Both the United States' FB-111 and the Soviet Union's
BACKFIRE bomber are weapon systems that could be considered
strategic depending on one's interpretation. Because each
platform is capable of in-flight refueling, and therefore
has the potential of reaching the opponent's homeland, both
are included in the strategic force inventory.
As indicated by the total number of delivery vehicles
listed in Table 1, the Soviets apparently have a significant
lead in this category. However, this statistic does not
consider the number of warheads that can be placed on
targets in the opponent's territory. Therefore, the next
step of assessing the balance is to calculate the number of
warheads in the U.S. /USSR inventory. This calculation is
accomplished by multiplying the number of delivery vehicles
by the maximum number of warheads capable of being carried.
Once again uncertainties arise due to the possibility of an
opponent deploying more or less than the maximum number
estimated, but this method seems sufficient based on current
intelligence capabilities. Table 1 computes the number of
re-entry vehicles and demonstrates that the U.S. has
apparently reversed the balance that existed under the
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delivery system category. An explanation for this
phenomenon is the expanded use of multiple warheads on
missiles and bombers by the U.S.
Although the U.S. appears to have an advantage in the
strategic balance due to the use of multiple warheads and
bomber loading capabilities, the Soviets possess a
significant edge in certain terms such as missile throw-
weight. Table 1 displays this Soviet advantage. Should the
Soviets decide to take advantage of their superiority in
this area by placing more warheads on each missile, the
warhead gap and therefore other more dynamic indicators
could be changed dramatically.
To better appreciate how the static force inventory
affects the strategic balance, observe the trends in this
inventory as presented in Table 2. Once again it is
apparent that currently the Soviets have a commanding lead
in delivery vehicles while the U.S. fairs better in the
number of warheads. However, the most significant
observation from this table is the rapid rate at which the
Soviets first approached and then exceeded the U.S. in every
category except number of warheads. This rapid procurement
capability must be factored into any appraisal of the
balance because it demonstrates the Soviets' capacity to
significantly alter the path of future trends.
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TABLE 2



























6100 2275 9700 8300 15003 12410
Source: (Pease, 1983, p. 15) and author.
So far all of this discussion has concentrated on the
numbers of strategic weapons. In an attempt to capture many
of the qualitative features of these weapons, several
composite measures are used to standardize potential (Pease,
1983, p. 16). The qualitative features of interest to this
study involve: delivery vehicle range and accuracy, warhead
yield, and hardened target characteristics. The measures
that provide the most insight into the qualitative features
include: Equivalent Megatonnage (EMT) , Hard Target Kill
(HTK) Potential, and Time Urgent Hard Target Kill (TUHTK)
Potential. There are obviously other meaningful MOEs, but
those mentioned above can be used at the unclassified level
to illustrate the points necessary for demonstrating net
assessment capabilities. Definitions for EMT, HTK and TUHTK
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Potential are listed:
1) Equivalent Megatonnage—recognizes the fact that a
weapon with a 2 Megaton (MT) yield does not produce
2 times the damage of a 1 MT weapon. Analysis shows
that the area subjected to a given blast overpressure
is proportional to the two-thirds power of the
weapon's yield. In terms of a soft urban-industrial
area target, if the target area is large enough, a 2
MT weapon will destroy only a little more than seven
times that of a 1 MT weapon. The sum of the
individual weapon's EMT of force (is) defined as the
force EMT and (is) an indication of the total soft
target area which could be covered by a ideal barrage.
2) Hard Target Kill Potential—a comparison of the
ability of either force to destroy hardened targets.
The composition and characteristics of each force are
used against a given target set. The number of
hardened targets which can be killed is compared.
3) Time Urgent Hard Target Kill Potential—a comparison
of the ability of either force to destroy hardened
targets before the platforms at the target sites are
launched or redeploy. (DNA, 1983, pp. 7-8)
Figure 3 provides an illustration of U.S. /USSR Strategic
Nuclear Force (SNF) competition by utilizing several static
indicators in the form of ratios. The values are the result
of summing individual weapon characteristics. This format
compares the forces in terms of parity or equivalence
(Pease, 1983, p. 17). This graph allows a comparison of
force weapons strength (warheads) , soft target damage
capability (EMT) , and hard target destruction potential (HTK
&TUHTK)
.
The U.S. has been able to hold on to a slight margin in





















Equivalent Megatons ^ ^^ *
Time-urgent Hard-target Kill Potential*
**
Soviet Advantage
-J \ \ I \ L I
76 78 80 82 84
Calendar Year
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• Total active inventory (includes FB-111 and BACKFIRE)
• * Hard-target kill potential represents ability to destroy targets rein-
forced to withstand some effects of a nuclear blast.
•** Calculations aie based on potential against identically hardened
targets.
Source: (Crowe, 1988, p. 43)
Figure 3. Pre-Attack Static Ratio Comparison
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U.S.'s lead in warheads is due to greater use of multiple
warheads on SNDVs. The advantage of HTK Potential is due to
greater accuracy of U.S. SNDVs.
Because the Soviets maintain higher yield warheads,
higher missile throw-weight capacity, and a continuing
program of target hardening, they are afforded a margin in
EMT and TUHTK Potential.
The trend away from U.S. advantage in the late 197 0s of
all pre-attack static measures prompted strong action by the
Reagan Administration. Efforts to increase warhead payload,
improve SNDV accuracy, and improve bomber penetration
abilities provided a shift in the trend favorable to the
U.S. However, significantly larger Soviet warheads and
years of effort on passive defense will probably keep the
Soviets ahead in EMT and TUHTK Potential for the foreseeable
future
.
Figure 4 represents an analyst's prediction of future
trends in the same static force measurements. This type of
forecasting is based on the assumption that trends will
continue, that procurement plans are accepted, and that arms
control agreements do not go into effect. Deployment of the
MX Peacekeeper, Trident II (D-5) , and the B-IB bomber are
reasons for the continued swing of favorable statistics
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* Total active inventory (includes FB-111 and BACKFIRE and
deployment of 100 PEACEKEEPERS)
•* Hard-target kill potential represents ability to destroy targets rein-
forced to withstand sonne effects of a nuclear blast.
** Calculations are based on potential against identically hardened
targets.
Source: (Crowe, 1988, p. 44)
Figuer 4. Pre-Attack Static Ratio Comparison
(with Current Soviet Trends)
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graph, uncertainty bands should be added to account for the
inability to accurately predict the future.
This comparison has so far concentrated on the static
capabilities of the competition. No mention has been made
concerning how each would fare as a result of some
confrontation. These true dynamic force-on-force
comparisons are much more difficult to conduct and are
usually more politically ticklish than the static side-by-
side comparisons. However, these calculations are important
to judge if the U.S. can obtain its objectives should
deterrence fail.
The list of considerations to be evaluated in
preparation for the failure of deterrence is endless.
Analysts must consider the effect of a nuclear exchange on
the competitors population and industry. Efforts at civil
defense and industrial hardening probably will play a role
in a nation's ability to obtain war termination objectives.
Additionally, the analyst needs to make estimates as to
the strategic force capabilities that will be available to
"national command authorities" following the outbreak of
hostilities. In effect this analysis is asking "What would
the results be if a war were to be fought with this
targeting plan and these arsenals of strategic weapons?"
(Baugh, 1984, p. 134) Measures such as Expected Surviving
ICBMs and Expected Residual EMT are examples of such
calculations. However, this analysis must cover a wide
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variety of scenarios in addition to the "bolt from the blue
attack." For example, the loss of SSBNs to ASW attack, the
loss of ICBMs to special forces attack, and the loss of
bomber and tanker capability during the conventional phase
of a war must be factored into the balance calculations.
Current efforts to analyze opposing strategic forces in
a war-time environment use computer generated "arsenal
exchange" models. (Pease, 1983, p. 23) These models can
deal with strategic inventory exchanges assuming ideal
conditions. Although this all out exchange is a very
important scenario, it is by no means the only one possible.
Several inadequacies of the this type of modeling are:
1) modeling nuclear force employment in isolation from
other key elements of military operations—i.e., no
prior attrition to strategic forces.
2) assuming away important operational factors—i.e., C-^
connectivity is perfect.
3) comparing the forces by defining goals for damage
expectancies and then measuring the results in terms
of residual weapons, rather than in terms of what
effect the nuclear exchanges might have had on the
ongoing military campaign.
4) modeling too narrow a set of nuclear war scenarios
—
massive exchanges with two principal variables—alert
posture and launch under attack policy. (Pease, 1983,
p. 25)
D. CASE STUDY OF SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE
(SLBM) EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE (EMT)
The sea-based leg of the Soviet nuclear forces is of
particular importance to the strategic balance. U.S. Naval
declaratory policy, such as the Maritime Strategy, is
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largely affected by the assessment of this Soviet
capability. This limited case will use a static side-by-
side measure to examine the net assessment process.
A suitable measurement of capabilities of the strategic
submarine force is on-patrol EMT. As CDR James Tritten
points out:
Although EMT is but one measure of effectiveness, it is
easy to understand, can be constructed from unclassified
data, and is useful in determining potential destruction
of all type targets. EMT can measure the ability to
conduct barrage attacks such as that which might be
contemplated against mobile targets. (Tritten, 1983, p.
70)
Table 3 presents the calculations used to arrive at the on-
patrol EMT for the U.S. Navy. Statistics on the number of
submarines per class, the number of launchers per submarine,
the number of warheads per missile, and warhead yield are
provided by the International Institute of Strategic
Studies' (IISS) , The Military Balance. 1988-1989 .
Submarine availability used in these calculations is base on
operating schedules, maintenance periodicity, and expected
missile and launcher reliability. U.S. submarine
availability is currently estimated to be 55% and 66% for
Poseidon and Ohio class submarines respectively (Tritten,
1983, pp. 68-69). Warhead EMT is calculated taking
individual warhead yield to the two-thirds power; total
force EMT is calculated by summing the EMT of the individual




U.S. ON-PATROL SLBM EMT
SUBS L/S
POSEIDON SUB W/ C-3 2 4 16
POSEIDON SUB W/ C-4 12 16
OHIO SUB W/ C-4 8 2 4
TOTAL
W/M AVAIL EMT/W EMT
10 55% 0.12 247.0
8 55% 0.22 182.0














CDR Tritten's 1986 calculation of Soviet submarine on-
patrol EMT is adequate for comparisons in this study despite
some changes to Soviet submarine inventory. He calculated
that YANKEES patrolling close-in to the U.S. are capable of
56 EMT and Soviet submarines patrolling home waters are
capable of 80.5 EMT: for a total of 136.5 EMT (Tritten,
1986, p. 136)
.
The large difference between SLBM EMT of the U.S. (647.4
EMT) and the USSR (13 6.5 EMT) raises many questions and
identifies some difficult problems for the analysts. An
evaluation of this situation is based on two assumptions:
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1) SLBMs make up some or all of Soviet "strategic reserve,"
and 2) U.S. military planning is based on defense against a
Soviet "bolt from the blue."
If Soviet SLBMs make up all of the Soviet strategic
reserve, the implications of a "successful" U.S. Maritime
Strategy is of great importance. The disparity between U.S.
and Soviet on-patrol EMT leads one to believe that the
Soviets have more to lose. The possibility that Soviets
might use or lose these reserves when threatened by
strategic ASW forces must be presented to the policy-maker.
Military and political leadership need to be aware of
the possibility that land-based and air-breathing platforms
may supplement SLBMs in the strategic reserve. Such a
prospect could affect the outcome of war termination
negotiations if the U.S. was mislead into believing that the
"small" SLBM reserve was all it had to contend with.
The gap between U.S. /USSR on-patrol EMT can possibly be
explained in terms of Soviet confidence in deterring U.S.
actions. Although the U.S. depends on at least 4 00 EMT for
deterrence (Tritten, 1986, p. 120), the Soviets may feel
assured with as little as 13 6 EMT. Such an asymmetry is an
important aspect to determining an accurate account of the
U.S. /USSR strategic balance.
This case study is not intended to answer these
questions of force posture but instead to point out that the
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net assessment process solicits substantive questions and
spotlights the issues affecting policies and programs.
E. SUMMARY
Based on the premise that the objective of the U.S.
strategic force is to deter nuclear attack and a wide range
of conflict scenarios, the planned strategic force
modernization appears adequate. This conclusion is drawn
from analysis of trends in static force comparisons.
Although current U.S. strategic forces are probably capable
of discouraging Soviet leadership from launching a
preemptive nuclear strike, only continued U.S. efforts in
offensive strategic force modernization and strategic
defense implementation will deter the Soviets across a broad
spectrum of situations.
The traditional method of evaluating the strategic
balance, as outlined in this chapter, is adequate in terms
of the simple static indices of weapons. However, the need
to include measures of force effectiveness in a dynamic
situation is great. A net assessment of the strategic
balance is not complete until it addresses likely war
outcomes should deterrence fail and the effect that
international actors other than the superpowers have on the
interaction. An effort to come to grips with these problems
of analysis is the subject of Chapter IV.
44
IV. IMPROVED ANALYSIS METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
The case study conducted in Chapter III illustrates the
importance of measuring the effectiveness of opposing
strategic nuclear force postures over a wide range of
interactions. The models and calculations used to conduct
these measurements became the subject of criticism in the
late 1970s. An attempt to make improvements in this area of
analysis resulted in the development of a computer-based
political-military simulation called RAND Strategy
Assessment System (RSAS) . This chapter will discuss RSAS '
s




Before continuing, several concepts of analysis need to
be explained to ensure a full comprehension of RSAS. A
definition of models, simulations, and games, as well as the
advantages and disadvantages associated with each, should
suffice. This discussion is not intended to be an all
inclusive documentation of these analytic tools, nor is it




A model is defined as "an abstract representation of
reality which is used for the purpose of prediction and to
develop understanding about the real-world process." (USDA
Models Review Committee, 1971, p. 1) Models are usually
mathematical and may be either manual or automated. They
can range in complexity from simple illustrations of a
system, such as a ship model, to an intricate arrangement of
algorithms and formulas intended to demonstrate the workings
of an organization. The advantages of models are best
described by Graubard and Builder:
Assumptions are usually explicit or explicable,
particularly in the simpler models. Cause and effects,
and relationships, are either defined or can be
determined. Results can usually be independently
reproduced and verified. These characteristics have
helped to make computer models the principal analytic tool
for the description, evaluation, and communication of
strategic force exchange outcomes. (Graubard and Builder,
1982, p. 72)
Several features are available to the analyst through the
use of models. Models provide:
1) transparency—the capability to make clear to users of
the analysis which assumptions, data algorithms, etc.,
were the key factors determining specific results.
2) reproducibility—the capability to duplicate the event
to allow an examination of the key factors determining
specific results.
3) rigor--the state of structure of the analysis,
especially explicit listings of assumptions, data
algorithms, etc., that lends itself to detailed
examination.
Models are not, however, without their drawbacks. It is
just not possible to assimilate all variables of a complex
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event such as war. Multifarious factors such as individual
attitudes, national will, and the "fog of war" are outside
the realm of contemporary model making.
2. Simulations
The USDA Models Review Committee describes a
simulation as:
. . .a model which runs completely without human
intervention. In this type of model events in the
different combat processes are essentially followed in
sequence, and decisions are based on predetermined rules
which are programmed in to the automated evaluation
procedure. (USDA Models Review Committee, 1971, p. 2)
Simulations attempt to depict a real world situation by
expanding on mathematical representation. The outcome of a
simulation can depend either on a random probability
distribution (stochastic) or a fixed outcome table (deter-
ministic) . The most important aspect of a simulation is
that it can be used to represent a process. As with the
simple model, simulations are limited in their ability to





...a model of a situation of competition or conflict in
which opposing players decide which course of action to
follow on the basis of their knowledge about their own
situation and intentions and on their (usually incomplete)
information about their opponent's course of action.
(USDA Models Review Committee, 1971, p. 3)
Human involvement is the most distinguishing feature
of a game. The fact that people are involved brings to
light many of the uncertainties that are beyond the
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capabilities of plain models and simulations. An example of
a game is a wargame "in which individuals simulating
decision-makers in real life use their judgment to perform
the decision functions in the model." (USDA Models Review
Committee, 1971, p. 5) While providing insight into non-
quantifiable matters, gaming suffers by
...relinquishing almost all control over the underlying
assumptions, relationships, and reproducibility of the
results to the individual judgments and caprices of the
players. While the experience for the player may be
excellent training, it is extremely difficult to extrapo-
late and apply the results directly to the rigorous
assessment of policy, program or operational choices.
(Graubard and Buildier, 1982, p. 73)
Although games provide a more accurate picture of how events
might transpire, they lack the analytic rigidity to allow
in-depth analysis concerning the process of events.
C. DEVELOPMENT
As the nuclear weapons postures of both superpowers
evolved, so did the methods of analyzing the strategic
forces. In the 1950s, political-military games and the
quantification of nuclear weapons effects were the center of
analytic attention.
Modeling received greater attention during the 1960s in
an attempt to quantify massive strategic nuclear exchanges.
Computer modeling, because of memory storage capabilities
and rapid calculation rate, also became widely used in
analysis and military force programming.
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In the 1970s, political and military authorities began
to realize that a variety of situations, factors, and
operational aspects had to be considered to provide an
adequate analysis of opposing nuclear forces. The standard
"arsenal exchange" model assuming a massive Soviet attack
followed by a massive U.S. retaliation did not consider
these other aspects. Dissatisfaction with prevalent
computer models and worsening trends in the U.S. /USSR
strategic balance prompted action to improve analytic
techniques. (Marshall, 1982, p. 49)
The recommended course of action, drafted by a 1978
Defense Science Board study, was to develop a wargaming
style of analysis. In 1979, the Defense Department sought
contractor assistance for the stated recommendation with
these objectives:
1) To provide more flexible analytic tools that evaluate
and compare capabilities of U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces in a wide range of scenarios and contingencies
including crises, theater of war, and large scale
nuclear conflict and its aftermath.
2) To allow the strategic nuclear forces to be considered
together with other relevant forces, nuclear and
conventional.
3) To allow a richer set of operational factors to be
included in the analysis.
4) To include explicitly, in an integral way, those
aspects of a large conflict now being treated
separately, or not at all (e.g., space, command and
control, anti-submarine warfare, tactics, etc.).
(Marshall, 1982, p. 49)
Of ten competitive contractors, the RAND Corporation
was selected to continue with the design under a project
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entitled "Improving Methods of Strategic Analysis." The
concept developed by RAND incorporated the best features of
analytic models and the best features of political-military
games into a computer simulation. Modeling allows a high
degree of analytic assessment; gaming captures the
uncertainties and qualitative factors of war and human
behavior; computers provide the memory storage capability
and high calculation rate. The effort by RAND evolved into
the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS)
.
D. RAND STRATEGY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (RSAS)
RSAS uses five components or agents to interact in a
complex political-military simulation. Three of the agents,
coded Red, Blue, and Green, represent the Soviet Union, the
United States, and non-superpower actors respectively. The
Red, Blue, and Green agents are controlled by decision
models that portray the national and military command
structures of the U.S. /NATO and USSR/WTO and third
countries. Based on the environment set by a World
Situation Data Set, the "national command authorities"-^ of
the Red and Blue agents develop objectives and specify
strategies to the military command authorities. The
-^Red and Blue political decision models emulate the
Defense Council and the National Command Authority
respectively. The capability exists to select between two
degrees of political climate with one selection being more
aggressive than the other (i.e., IVAN 1, IVAN 2, SAM 1, SAM
2).
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military command authorities^ make decisions and give orders
based on analytic war plans designed from prior games and
studies. Figure 5 depicts the interaction between command
authorities. The Green agent interacts to simulate third
country involvement. Any or all of these agents can be
replaced by human players.
The output (decision) from the Red, Blue, and Green
agents are sent to the fourth component, the Force agent.
The Force agent, a simulation model, tracks military forces
worldwide and assesses battle outcome. All levels of
combat, including conventional, naval, theater-nuclear, and
intercontinental nuclear warfare, can be treated. The
results are returned to the Red, Blue, and Green agents for
further action. The Force agent is also tasked with the
referee functions (i.e., time keeping) of a standard
wargame
.
The fifth agent, the Control agent, provides a means for
the analyst to input parameters that will affect the
scenario of the game. This capability allows the analyst to
affect the game and evaluate the results in a controlled
^Red and Blue military decision models are patterned
after the Soviet General Staff (VGK) and U.S. /NATO Joint
Chiefs of Staff/Military Committee. Lower echelon command
organizations (TVDs and CINCs) are also represented.
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Source: (Davis and Hall, 1988, p. 27)
Figure 5. Hierarchical Structure of RSAS Agents
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fashion. Figure 6 is a graphical representation of the RSAS
structure. (Davis, 1987, p. 3)^
E. RSAS FEATURES
A number of valuable features are available to the
analyst through RSAS. Some of the more important attributes
include:
1) The system can be operated in a fully automatic mode
pitting two experts against each other or in a semi-
automatic mode allowing humans to play from the
position of any agent.
2) The models are deterministic (outcomes do not involve
chance and events are dependent on the input) enabling
repeated plays with variable modification for
sensitivity analysis.
3) Transparency is possible because all model decisions
and simulation results are automatically logged and
can be viewed on-screen.
4) A game within a game (called "lookahead") can be run
by the system to test proposed strategies.
5) RAND-ABLE, a novel programming language, provides
improved user-computer interface.
RSAS is not an end in itself, but merely a means to
improve analysis. It will not provide a solution to a
policy question nor will it accurately predict the outcome
of conflict. The concept of analytic wargaming on a global
scale should not be considered as an input to strategic
planning, but rather it should be thought of as a way to
•^For a more detailed explanation of RSAS, see The RAND
Strategy Assessment System at the Naval Postgraduate School ,



































evaluate the output of strategic research. As such, RSAS
provides the analyst with a number of valuable capabilities.
1) The deterministic models and the wide range of combat
scenarios available allow the analyst to identify the
key variables that affect battle outcome.
2) The top down structure of the command authority allows
the analyst to focus on integrated strategy-level
considerations without becoming concerned about the
details of military operations. (Davis, 1987, p. 1)
3) Entry into the various levels of the command authority
allows the user to address operational-level issues
without becoming concerned with strategy-level
planning. (Davis, 1987, p. 1)
4) The replacement of humans with decision models allows
play to occur much more rapidly so as to enable a
broad range of scenarios to be run and considered.
Development of RSAS is still in progress and several
shortcomings still exist. Of particular interest to this
study is the lack of adequate models that represent naval
warfare (Tritten and Channell, 1988, p. 4). RAND and OSD/NA
should take steps to upgrade RSAS ' s naval components so as
to better model global warfare.
One additional shortcoming noted is the inadequate
method of measuring battle outcomes. Determining whether
the result is favorable or not in terms of the
organization's objectives is not well understood. Because
of this defect, identifying key variables that affect
outcome is extremely difficult.
F. SUMMARY
Improving strategic assessment through analytic
wargaming is a multi-year project that is still evolving.
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The goal is not to have an answer machine for decision-
makers and analysis. What is expected is a method of
analyzing force postures under multi-scenario, multi-
variable conditions. The concept of analytic wargaming
embodied in RSAS should allow the analyst to conduct
numerous runs that reflect various uncertainties present in
the real world.
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Attempting to gather the facts together and form an
appraisal of the situation is not a new phenomenon.
Decision-makers and analysts have always been doing this
intuitively. But such efforts lack structure and can miss
the important issues unless the individual (s) conducting the
analysis are blessed with exceptional talent or significant
experience. Attempts to institutionalize the talent and
experience have lead to a number of successful concepts.
This thesis has concentrated on the method of analysis known
as net assessment.
The development of net assessment, nearly two decades
ago, and improvements since have largely been due to Mr.
Andrew Marshall. Although building on groundwork laid by
other notable individuals such as Robert McNamara, Charles
Hitch, and Alain Enthoven, Marshall's concept of analysis
provided the structure to ask the questions that need to be
asked and present issues to better evaluate intended policy.
Net assessment is not many things. It is not an answer
machine to provide the solution to difficult or easy
questions. It is not a programming filter that removes
institutional biases or political prejudices. Net
assessment, as a process, is no better than the men and
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women that conduct them or the information that is used in
performing them.
Net assessment does, however, have a great deal to offer
the strategic planning and management world. The
systematic, organized approach to analysis incorporated in
the net assessment process provides a path for the analyst
and decision-maker to follow.
To make the information more prone to analysis and the
analysis more prone to presentation, assessments are broken
down into several categories; balance assessments, policy
assessments, net technical assessments, comparative
assessments, operational assessments, and weapons
comparisons. These assessments take the standard static,
side-by-side comparisons as one important input and then try
to go beyond by examining the qualitative factors (i.e.,
training, leadership, moral, doctrine, etc.) and the dynamic
force-on-force calculations. Qualitative factors and
dynamic calculations are no less difficult to evaluate
because of net assessment, but must be coped with to make
the best appraisal possible. Additionally, net assessments
try to come to grip with uncertainties and asymmetries that
exist between opponents. By systematically approaching the
state of competition, a net assessment can assist a
decision-maker face a policy decision with the best
infoirmation available. Several examples of such policy
issues are: does the U.S. need to invest its defense
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dollars into a conventional navy or strategic nuclear
forces?, are the U.S.'s basic planning assumptions robust
enough to absorb certain unexpected circumstances?, has the
U.S. thought through the range of scenarios or is it locked
into a single scenario?
As with any other process, net assessment continues to
evolve. Several areas are worthy of note. First, efforts
should continue to improve methods of analysis through the
use of analytic wargaming. RSAS as an analytic tool is
useful in viewing the broad range of possible scenarios and
helpful in identifying the key variables that affect the
outcome of likely scenarios. The thrust of development of
RSAS, however, should not be limited to strategic and the
Central Front issues. Naval models have been found wanting
and are in need of upgrading. Analysis of all forms of
conflict can benefit from the use of RSAS.
Efforts to link the Intelligence Community directly to
the conduct of net assessments should be discontinued. By
separating intelligence and net assessment functions, a more
accurate picture of the threat containing fewer mirror-
images can be obtained. This separation of responsibilities
will allow the intelligence officer to concentrate on
appraising the enemy and provide the net assessment analyst
with the most accurate account of the opponent possible.
Attempts to establish net assessment offices in each of
the military services should continue with increased vigor.
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As previously stated, a net assessment is not the solution
to all the problems, but this method of analysis can present
military command authorities with the most un-biased, non-
partisan information humanly possible. The appraisal may
not be universally accepted or politically tolerable, but
the information provided the decision-maker is vital to the
organization none the less. This recommendation is not so
unusual given the fact that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff is required to conduct a net assessment on the
military balance by the Goldwater-Nicholas Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986.
Finally, efforts should continue to ensure that modern
day analysis is validated by historical data. A study
conducted on the military balance of 1940 showed "that the
German forces in a reconstruction of armored divisions
equivalent measures were about 5 to 10 percent inferior to
the combined French, British, Belgian, and Dutch forces."
(Marshall, 1983, p. 13) Clearly, the key variables in
determining success of the competitors were not identified.
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